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IN BRIEF
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There Thailand confront a shortage of children to historical proportions: in just over fifty years, the number of annual births has fallen from a threshold exceeding one million in the 1960s to only 416 514 births in 2025, far from the peak of more than 1.2 million reached in 1971, a generation that had supported the industrialization and growth of the country.
The demographic shift is clear: by 2025 the death (559,684) have surpassed births for the fifth consecutive year, while the fertility rate dropped to approximately 1 child per woman in 2024, a level lower than that of Japan and unprecedented in Southeast Asia according to demographers.
The social consequences materialize locally: schools Public and private schools are closing or are becoming largely under-filled — several hundred establishments are affected — and the migration of parents to large cities leaves many children entrusted to grandparents.
Public responses remain limited: previous incentive campaigns have had little effect, and a new strategy launched in 2026, Every Birth Matters, emphasizes maternal mental health, but the allowances The current rates (a few hundred baht) remain well below the actual cost of custody, despite more generous political proposals, while the projections They anticipate fewer than 400,000 births starting next year.
Thailand is undergoing a profound demographic shift: after surpassing one million births annually in the 1960s and reaching a peak in 1971, the country now records less than half that number of births. By 2025, only 416.514 births were counted against 559,684 deaths, marking the fifth consecutive year that the number of deaths has exceeded the number of births. This phenomenon, linked to a fertility rate fell to 1 child per woman in 2024, poses significant challenges for education, the economy and the Thai social model.
A historic demographic shift
Thailand’s demographic trajectory has undergone rapid transformations over the past sixty years. In 1963, the country surpassed one million births annually for the first time; the record peak was in 1971 with 1,221,228 births. This generation largely supplied the industrial workforce and fueled urban growth, particularly the construction and boom of Bangkok. Today, this cohort is gradually reaching retirement age, while the birth rate is declining.
Data published in January 2026 by the Department of Provincial Administration confirms the scale of the reversal: 416.514 births in 2025, and an excess of deaths over births for the fifth consecutive year. The most recent demographic projections suggest there could be fewer 400,000 births as early as the following year if current trends persist.
Schools are emptying out.
The decline in births is already beginning to be seen on the ground, particularly in the education sector. According to the Ministry of Education, 346 public schools They no longer accept any students. Of the 29,082 schools surveyed, 75 have permanently closed and 26 others are awaiting closure. In the private sector, between 70 and 80 schools have ceased operations this year, compared to the usual 30 to 50.
Some schools designed for 500 students now operate with fewer than 200, while others are being sold to property developers. The Minister of Education, Narumon Pinyosinwat, recognized these difficulties, which combine with the phenomenon of internal migration: parents leave the countryside for the cities and sometimes leave their children with grandparents, changing the family composition and local educational needs.
A striking regional contrast: the case of Cambodia
The situation in Thailand stands out sharply from the rest of the region. In Cambodia, the streets, markets, and schools are still largely populated by young people: the fertility rate there is around 2.5 children per woman and the median age is around 27 years old, against 41 years old in Thailand. Despite a lower level of wealth — Cambodia’s GDP per capita being estimated at around $2,700 against almost $7,000 For Thailand — the birth rate remains strong.
The contrast is largely explained by different development trajectories: rapid urbanization, rising housing costs, increased education and service expenses, and evolving individual aspirations all tend to reduce the number of children per family. Thailand embarked on these paths earlier and faster than its neighbors, but without the necessary financial and institutional resources to mitigate the consequences, as analyzed by Chalermpol Chamchan, director of the Institute for Demographic and Social Research at Mahidol University.
Public policies: timid responses and new initiatives
Thai authorities have launched numerous campaigns and measures to reverse the trend, often with limited results. The previous government campaign, titled “Having children for the Nation”, has produced no measurable effect according to several demographers. Faced with the continued deterioration, the Ministry of Health launched a new strategy in April 2026 called “Every Birth Matters”, which places particular emphasis on the mental health mothers.
Existing financial assistance remains modest: between 600 and 1,000 baht per month, while the actual cost of childcare is estimated to be between 2,500 and 5,000 baht monthly. Before the February 2026 parliamentary elections, some parties had proposed more ambitious measures: the Democrat Party suggested 5,000 baht per month for the first year, while Thai Sang Thai proposed 2,000 baht for up to six years. Social criticism emphasizes the idea that the state should not simply encourage births, but must build a company that supports families, as formulated by Nattaya Boonpakdee, candidate of the People’s Party.
Economic and social consequences
The aging population and the shrinking number of young workers will have repercussions across several sectors. A smaller workforce weighs on industrial competitiveness, weakens tax revenues, and increases pressure on healthcare and pension systems. The collapse in school enrollment could lead to a reorganization of the school system, school closures, building renovations, and territorial imbalances between urban and rural areas.
At the same time, the scenario of an older population requires massive investments in health services, the adaptation of urban infrastructure and the overhaul of social protection policies — investments that Thailand may not necessarily be able to finance at the same level as the most developed countries, accentuating the challenge.
International comparisons and lessons learned
Thailand is not the first to face a rapid decline in its birth rate; other Asian countries have experienced similar trajectories and are proposing a variety of solutions. Some countries have chosen to strengthen family benefits, while others have reshaped housing and employment policies to make parenthood more compatible with working life. Recent experiences in Vietnam indicate a renewed pro-natalist approach after decades of restrictive policies, demonstrating that it is possible to alter demographic trends through a coherent set of measures.
To delve deeper into the analysis and the issues at stake, several articles and investigations describe this challenge from different angles: context and possible solutions on adrip, demographic overview and recent years on Thaivisa And All of Thailandgeopolitical investigations on GEO, and regional or comparative perspectives on Southeast Asia And Vietnam Today.
- Historical trend : drop in births from over 1 million in 1963 to 416514 in 2025; peak in one thousand nine hundred seventy-one at 1221228.
- Demographic imbalance : five consecutive years where deaths outnumber births (559,684 deaths in 2025).
- Fertility rate : fell to approximately 1 child per woman in 2024, a level lower than that of Japan and unique in Southeast Asia.
- Aging : generation of the peak birth rate entering retirement, pressure on labor and social systems.
- Urbanization and cost of living: housing, education and childcare are hindering the decision to have children.
- Internal migrations : departures of parents to the cities, children often entrusted to grandparents.
- Empty schools : 346 public schools without pupils; 75 permanently closed, 26 pending; private closures on the rise (70–80 this year).
- Overcapacity : establishments designed for 500 students sometimes operate with fewer than 200, some plots of land being sold for real estate.
- Regional comparison : Cambodia — fertility ≈ 2.5median age 27 years old vs Thailand median age 41 years old, despite a lower GDP per capita.
- Public policies : previous campaigns ineffective; new strategy launched in April 2026 (Every Birth Matters) focused on maternal mental health.
- Financial aid : current allowances 600–1000 baht/month against actual estimated care cost 2500–5000 baht/month; political proposals ranging from 2000 to 5000 baht depending on the parties.
- Projection : risk of falling below 400,000 births as early as next year.
Understanding the decline in births in Thailand and its effects
Q: What is the extent of the demographic decline in Thailand?
A: The figures show a sharp decline: after having crossed the one million mark for the first time births annual in 1963 and reaching a peak in 1971 with 1,221,228 births, Thailand has only recorded 416.514 births in 2025 (data published in January 2026 by the Department of Provincial Administration). In 2025, the death were higher than births (559,684), marking the fifth consecutive year that deaths have exceeded births.
Q: What are the main causes of this decline in the birth rate?
A: Several factors combine: a fertility which has fallen to ~1 child per woman in 2024, accelerated urbanization, and rising costs of accommodation, of theeducation and family life. Development trajectories and lifestyle choices explain why Thailand began this shift earlier than its neighbors.
Q: What demographic and economic effects are expected in the short and medium term?
A: In the short term, we are already observing a aging of the population and a potential contraction of the available workforce. The generation born around the 1971 peak, which supported industrialization, is beginning to leave for the retirementThis will put pressure on social protection systems, health services and the labor market.
Q: How does the decline in birth rates manifest itself in the education system?
A: The consequences are visible: according to the Ministry of Education, 346 schools Public schools are no longer accepting any students among the 29,082 listed institutions; 75 have closed permanently and 26 are awaiting closure. In the private sector, between 70 and 80 schools have ceased operations this year, compared to the usual 30 to 50. Schools designed for 500 students are sometimes operating with fewer than 200, and some sites are being sold to property developers.
Q: Why is the contrast with Cambodia so marked?
A: THE Cambodia Cambodia has a fertility rate of approximately 2.5 children per woman and a median age of 27 years, compared to 41 years in Thailand. Despite a lower GDP per capita (≈ USD 2,700 for Cambodia versus ≈ USD 7,000 for Thailand), the development trajectory, the pace of urbanization, and social choices have led to a very different demographic situation between the two countries.
Q: What public policies have been implemented and are they effective?
A: Actions taken so far have had limited effects. A previous campaign entitled ” Having children for the Nation » has not produced a measurable impact. In April 2026, the Ministry of Health launched the strategy Every Birth Matters focused particularly on maternal mental health. Existing support varies between 600 and 1,000 baht per month, but the actual cost of childcare is estimated to be between 2,500 and 5,000 baht monthly, which shows a mismatch between public support and real needs.
Q: What proposals have been put forward by the political parties?
A: Before the February 2026 elections, several parties promised more generous measures: the Democratic Party offered 5,000 baht per month for the child’s first year, while Thai Sang Thai defended 2,000 baht until the age of six. Other voices, such as Nattaya Boonpakdee (People’s Party), called for an end to the requirement that citizens have children “for the Nation” and for building a society that is more protective of families.
Q: Why are budgetary measures alone likely to be insufficient?
A: Because the problem is multidimensional It combines economic constraints (cost of childcare, housing), social factors (professional pressures, family models), and territorial issues (rural depopulation, migration to cities). A single financial allowance does not resolve difficulties in accessing services, balancing work and family life, or the availability of affordable housing.
Q: What are the short-term demographic projections?
A: Current projections anticipate a continued decline: less than 400,000 births are expected as early as the following year, if current trends continue.
Q: Which sectors or territories are most exposed?
A: Rural areas and some provinces are already experiencing the depopulation and the closure of schools, while urban centers see families facing high housing and service costs. The sectors affected includeeducation, there health, THE pensions and the market work (labor and long-term consumption).
Q: What courses of action are being considered to mitigate the problem?
A: The approaches recommended by specialists include a combination of measures: strengthening services guard and preschool education, better-calibrated allowances, policies ofurban planning and affordable housing, support for work-life balance, and territorial strategies to revitalize rural areas. The objective is to act on the structural determinants in order to influence reproductive behaviors beyond purely monetary incentives.
